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AbstractÑThere is a reduction in the percentage penetration 
of synchronous machines within the GB power system; leading to 
a decrease in inertia, and an increase in system rate of change of 
frequency (RoCoF) following a frequency event. This raises the 
challenge of containing frequency deviations within the relevant 
operational limits. As a result, steps need to be taken by the 
system operator to manage the risk to system security. In order 
to better understand this risk, this paper presents the challenge 
in light of the changing energy landscape and the current and 
future frequency response services available to contain frequency 
deviations. Although frequency response services may be capable 
of containing some events within frequency limits, in low inertia 
scenarios these responses alone are not capable of containing 
excursions within practical RoCoF limits. Consequently, further 
action must be taken to ensure system security. The system 
operator currently employs an interim solution of limiting the 
largest loss risk, depending on system inertia and the RoCoF 
limit. While this is suitable in the short-term, it is unlikely that 
this option will be viable in the future.    
KeywordsÑfrequency response; frequency containment; loss 
risk; low inertia; RoCoF 
I.!  INTRODUCTION 
The inertia of a power system is an inherent capability that 
affects the rate of change of frequency (RoCoF) following a 
system event [1, 2]. Traditionally, inertia has been made 
available due to transmission connected synchronous 
machines; however, in Great Britain (GB) the percentage of 
synchronous machines in the power system is reducing [3, 4], 
while the penetration of technologies such as wind and solar 
power, which in their majority are converter connected, is 
increasing. These converter connected technologies, also 
referred to as non-synchronous technologies, are connected via 
a solid-state electronic converter and do not have the same 
inherent capability of providing inertia to the system [5, 1]. 
The relationship between system inertia, Hsys, and RoCoF, 
(df/dt), is shown in (1) where dP is the power imbalance and fo 
is the nominal frequency. It can be seen that as system inertia 
reduces, the RoCoF, increases for a given power imbalance.  
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If the RoCoF following a frequency deviation is too high, it 
increases the risk of cascading frequency events, as a result of 
the tripping of RoCoF relays; these relays, such as the loss of 
mains (LoM) protection relays, are designed to open relevant 
circuits when the system RoCoF reaches a given limit [6]. This 
raises concerns regarding the behaviour of the power system in 
the first few seconds following a mismatch of power supply 
and demand. There are operational limits, relating to both 
RoCoF and minimum or maximum frequency excursions that 
the GB system operator (SO) must ensure are respected in the 
event of a credible disturbance. In a system with decreasing 
penetration of synchronous generation the challenge of 
complying with these limits increases.  
In Section II, this paper will discuss the provision of 
frequency response services in GB. Following this, Section III 
will present two studies that investigate the containment of loss 
risk in the GB power system. Lastly, Section IV contains a 
discussion of the findings and an outline of the next steps of the 
research.  
II.! FREQUENCY RESPONSE IN GB 
Fig. 1 below is an illustration of the current GB frequency 
response services showing primary, secondary, and reserve. 
Fig. 2 illustrates the operating timescales of primary, 
secondary, high and enhanced frequency response services, 
while Table I provides the technical definitions of these 
services. With the exception of enhanced frequency response 
(EFR), these responses can be dynamic or non-dynamic. 
Dynamic frequency responses are response services that 
continuously track frequency deviations and provide the 
required response. Non-dynamic frequency responses are 
frequency-triggered services that include dynamic and static 
response; i.e., when a frequency trigger is reached these 
services can either continuously or discreetly respond to 
frequency deviations. Under European Network of 
Transmission System Operators for Electricity (ENTSO-E) 
definitions, primary response is roughly equivalent to 
frequency containment reserve, secondary response is 
equivalent to restoration reserve and reserve dispatch recovery 
is equivalent to replacement reserve [7].  
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Fig. 1: Illustrating the operation of GB frequency response services [8]. 
 
Fig. 2: Current GB frequency response services [9]. 
TABLE I. ! OVERVIEW OF FREQUENCY RESPONSE SERVICES [9, 10] 
Service Name Technical Definition 
Primary Frequency 
Response  
Full delivery of active power response 10 seconds 
after the event with a 2 second delay and 
sustained for a further 20 seconds. 
Secondary 
Frequency Response 
Full delivery of active power response 30 seconds 
after the event and sustained for 30 minutes. 
High Frequency 
Response 
Full delivery of active power response 10 seconds 
after the event with a 2 second delay and 
sustained indefinitely. 
Enhanced 
Frequency Response 
Full delivery of response for a 0.5 Hz change in 
frequency and sustained for 15 minutes. 
 
Conventional providers of dynamic frequency response 
services are synchronous generators. On the other hand, non-
synchronous generators are increasingly displacing 
synchronous generators. Under the status quo, the displacement 
of synchronous generation reduces system inertia and increases 
RoCoF during a power imbalance. Furthermore, the 
displacement results in simultaneously reducing the primary 
frequency response availability in terms of capacity and 
increasing primary frequency response requirement under 
traditional service arrangements, due to the higher RoCoF 
experienced for a given loss event. Consequently, the reduction 
in system inertia leads to concerns regarding containing a 
frequency event within the acceptable limits both in terms of 
RoCoF and frequency.  
III.! SYSTEM STUDIES 
An in-house developed single bus model representing the 
GB transmission system [11] in DigSILENT PowerFactory is 
used for the present system study. The study applies the 
following assumptions: 
¥! All the inertia in the system is represented in the inertia 
of the synchronous generators and no further inertia is 
provided by demand. 
¥! Demand provides an inherent active power response of 
2.5%/Hz [8]. 
¥! An inertia constant of 5 seconds is assumed for all 
synchronous generators. 
¥! Generation is split into synchronous and non-
synchronous generation. 
¥! Generation is further divided into flexible and non-
flexible, where flexible generation can provide active 
power response, while non-flexible cannot. 
¥! The response provided by flexible units is modeled as 
dynamic response. Flexible units are 75% loaded with 
response provided by 50% of the headroom [12]. 
¥! A normal loss of in-feed event of 1 GW of 
interconnector supply in modeled with a maximum 
frequency deviation of -0.5 Hz from nominal 50 Hz [13, 
14, 10]. 
¥! Unless otherwise stated system demand is 20 GW. 
In GB, the SO published the system operability framework 
(SOF) 2016 [9]. This document highlights, among other 
factors, the limits to largest loss of demand or generation, 
which are constrained by the system inertia and RoCoF limit. 
The RoCoF limit in GB is ±1 Hz/s for all new and existing 
generators with a delay of 500 ms [21,22]. The original 
document gave existing generators until the 1st July 2016 to 
make the relevant changes, however there is about 6 GW of 
distributed generation that are still using relays that could 
activate if RoCoF exceeds ±0.125 Hz/s [9]. This is significant 
since RoCoF relays are widely used in the UK and Ireland, in 
loss of mains (LOM) protection for distributed generation [15, 
16]. Consequently, due to the 6 GW of distributed generation 
still using the ±0.125 Hz/s RoCoF setting, ±0.125 Hz/s is the 
practical RoCoF limit in the GB power system, leading to a 
need to manage RoCoF within this limit during a frequency 
event. 
A.! Containing Normal Loss Risk Within ±0.5 Hz of Nominal 
Frequency with a ±0.125 Hz/s RoCoF Limit 
The present study will investigate the performance of the 
frequency response services in the GB power system to contain 
a normal loss risk of 1 GW when system post-fault inertia is 
130 GVAs. The performance will be measured in terms of 
containment to the defined limits of both RoCoF and frequency 
during a power imbalance.  
There are two factors that determine acceptable frequency 
behaviour during a power imbalance, the size of frequency 
deviation and RoCoF. Consequently, the system must be 
secured against the normal loss risk in terms of the frequency 
deviation and against the loss risk in terms of the RoCoF limit. 
In the case of a 130 GVAs system the loss risk defined by the 
±0.125 Hz/s RoCoF limit is calculated using (1) to be a loss 
risk of 650 MW. When compared to the 1 GW normal loss risk 
for a frequency deviation of ±0.5 Hz, the system must be 
secured against the smaller loss risk of 650 MW. However, in 
terms of generation a loss risk of 650 MW requires curtailment 
of any single unit (generator or interconnector) supplying 
power at the normal loss of in-feed limit of 1 GW.  
TABLE II. ! STUDY SCENARIOS FOR CONTAINING NORMAL LOSS RISK 
WITHIN ±0.5 HZ OF NOMINAL FREQUENCY WITH A ±0.125 HZ/S ROCOF LIMIT 
Title  Description 
Scenario A Loss risk is curtailed from 1 GW to 650 MW and 
implemented as the simulated loss of interconnector supply 
with primary response containing the frequency deviation. 
Scenario B Loss risk is 1 GW and implemented as the simulated loss of 
interconnector supply with no frequency response provision. 
Scenario C Loss risk is 1 GW and implemented as the simulated loss of 
interconnector supply with primary response and EFR 
containing the frequency deviation. 
Scenario D Loss risk is 1 GW and implemented as the simulated loss of 
interconnector supply with primary response containing the 
frequency deviation. 
 
To illustrate the issues surrounding the containment of loss 
risk in a low inertia power system, four scenarios are 
investigated using the system model and assumptions 
previously defined, these scenarios are presented in Table II 
above. The scenarios illustrate what would happen if different 
actions were taken to address containment of frequency 
following a power imbalance. Table III is an overview of the 
observations from the study, investigating the individual 
scenarios, while Fig. 3 and 4 below show the frequency and 
RoCoF plots for scenarios A - D. 
TABLE III. ! OVERVIEW OF STUDY SCENARIOS AND OBSERVATIONS  
 A B C D 
Loss 650 MW 1000 MW 
RoCoF 
Contained 
Yes No 
Frequency 
Deviation 
Contained 
Yes No Yes 
Inertia 130 GVAs 
Response 
Type 
Primary 
Only 
None 
Primary 
and EFR 
Primary 
Only 
 
Only in scenario A is the system event contained within 
both frequency and RoCoF limits, even with EFR simulated in 
scenario C. Scenario B is modeled for reference to indicate the 
frequency behaviour if no action is taken to contain the event. 
 
Fig. 3: Frequency plots comparing the impact of different actions to meet 
operational limits for a system with 130 GVAs of inertia. 
 
Fig. 4: RoCoF plots comparing the impact of different actions to meet 
operational limits for a system with 130 GVAs of inertia. 
B.! Containing Normal Loss Risk Within ±0.5 Hz of Nominal 
Frequency and a ±1 Hz/s RoCoF Limit 
Considering the effort being made by the SO to change 
RoCoF relay settings to operate at ±1 Hz/s instead of ±0.125 
Hz/s, the following study is conducted to investigate 
containment of loss risk using GB frequency response services 
at different system inertia, while remaining within the ±1 Hz/s 
RoCoF limit. The present study concerns the scenarios 
described in Table IV, and inherits the assumptions outlined in 
the previous study.  
TABLE IV. ! STUDY SCENARIOS FOR CONTAINING NORMAL LOSS RISK 
WITHIN ±0.5 HZ OF NOMINAL FREQUENCY AND A ±1 HZ/S ROCOF LIMIT 
Title Description 
Scenario 1 System inertia is 200 GVAs with EFR and TFR containing 
the frequency deviation. 
Scenario 2 System inertia is 50 GVAs with EFR and TFR containing the 
frequency deviation. 
Scenario 3 System inertia is 25 GVAs with EFR and TFR containing the 
frequency deviation. 
Scenario 4 System inertia is 50 GVAs with EFR and a 1s service 
containing the frequency deviation. 
Scenario 5 System inertia is 25 GVAs with EFR and a 1s service 
containing the frequency deviation. 
 
While still under development, a new concept for a post-
fault frequency response is proposed by the SO, alongside 
other improvements to the provision of frequency response. 
This concept post-fault service (1s service) is the full delivery 
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of response within 1 second with a maximum delay of 0.5 
seconds and sustained for 20 minutes [17]. The 1s service will 
work alongside existing services with the intent of replacing 
traditional primary response. As such, the 1s service will also 
be considered in this study.  
Table V provides an overview of the scenarios and 
observations of this study, while Fig. 5 and Fig. 6 show how 
these services perform at different levels of system inertia in 
response to the same 1 GW loss of interconnector supply. 
TABLE V. ! OVERVIEW OF STUDY SCENARIOS AND OBSERVATIONS  
  
Frequency 
Deviation 
Contained 
Frequency 
Stable Inertia 
Response 
Type 
Scenario 1 Yes Yes 200 GVAs 
EFR and 
Primary 
 Scenario 2 No (≈49 Hz) No 50 GVAs 
EFR and 
Primary 
 Scenario 3 No (≈48.6 Hz) Yes 25 GVAs 
EFR and 
Primary 
 Scenario 4 Yes Yes 50 GVAs 
EFR and 
1s service 
 Scenario 5 Yes No 25 GVAs 
EFR and 
1s service 
 
Upon consideration of the results of the study shown in Fig. 
5 and 6, and summarized in Table V, it is seen that while 
RoCoF is contained within the ±1 Hz/s limit in scenarios 1 - 5, 
frequency is contained in three of the five scenarios. 
Furthermore, two of those three scenarios indicate a stable 
frequency containment, with scenario 5 showing an instability 
that can lead to additional system events, exacerbating the 
impact of the loss of in-feed.  
It should be noted that the benefit of a 1s service is apparent 
when comparing scenarios 2 and 4. In scenario 2, EFR and 
primary response are not sufficient to contain the frequency 
deviation, and also pose a risk of further instability; while in 
scenario 4, primary response is replaced with the 1s service that 
together with EFR is capable of containing the frequency 
deviation, while keeping frequency stable. In addition, the 1s 
service can contain the loss event with less than half the 
amount of response reserve that was dispatched in scenario 2 
for primary response.  
On the other hand, one of the risks that arises from the 1s 
service entirely replacing primary response is shown at the very 
low system inertia of 25 GVAs in scenario 5. This risk is 
increased as the loss risk tends towards the maximum loss risk 
of 1800 MW, defined in the National Electricity Transmission 
System Security and Quality of Supply Standard (NETS 
SQSS) [13]. Using (1), the mathematical calculation of RoCoF 
for a loss of 1 GW at 50 GVAs of inertia is 0.5 Hz/s. This 
RoCoF of 0.5 Hz/s increases to 0.9 Hz/s for a loss of 1.8 GW at 
50 GVAs. This suggests that an increase of loss of in-feed from 
1 GW to 1.8 GW for a system inertia of 50 GVAs in scenario 4 
tends towards the results in scenario 5. Limiting the maximum 
output of the 1s service can reduce the risk of instability but 
this would also require the response reserve deficit to be met by 
other alternative frequency response services. Similarly, the 
loss risk can be curtailed but this incurs an additional cost that 
may not be sustainable in perpetuity.  
 
Fig. 5: Frequency plots comparing containment capabilities at different inertia 
levels with different response services. 
 
Fig. 6: RoCoF plots comparing containment capabilities at different inertia 
levels with different response services. 
IV.! DISCUSSION 
According to SOF by 2025/26 the loss limit will be 650 
MW about 25% of the time, in order to comply with the 
practical RoCoF limit of ±0.125 Hz/s; leading to curtailment of 
loss risk to comply. National Grid in [5] puts the cost of 
curtailing loss risk at £268m per annum by 2020, expected to 
increase year by year. Synchronous compensators are a 
potential solution that provides a range of system benefits [18]. 
It is plausible that implementation as the single solution to the 
issues of a very low (sub 75 GVAs) inertia GB power system 
would not be commercially viable, and indeed, the optimal 
solution may require a range of complimenting options. 
While it is likely that the practical RoCoF limit will be 
relaxed in the future, there is no indication as to when or how 
this will happen, and at what cost. Meanwhile, the costs to 
system security are increased because the GB power system 
already experiences operational scenarios where loss risk has to 
be curtailed for system security. In the meantime existing 
synchronous generators that are considering decommissioning 
could convert their stations to synchronous compensators, 
providing inertia alongside other benefits. Similarly, there may 
be an incentive for new installations at key locations across the 
power system. However, locational placement raises additional 
questions regarding regional variations in service requirements.  
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The paper shows that conventional frequency response 
services are unsuitable for adequately containing a normal loss 
risk as RoCoF approaches ±1 Hz/s. Similarly, while the study 
indicates the benefits of 1s service in comparison to primary 
response, it carries a risk at high RoCoF if the service 
completely replaces primary response. Although, the risk of the 
GB power system operating at low inertia levels sub 75 GVAs 
is extremely low before 2025 [9], it is possible that this may 
become more likely as the power system tends towards a 
greater percentage penetration of converter connected 
generation and accompanying closure of synchronous plant in 
the future. This raises the need for further study into how future 
frequency response services can be designed to accommodate 
such scenarios. In addition, while the 1s service as described in 
[17] is still under development, there are concerns raised by 
industry regarding the requirement to sustain a post-fault 
response for 20 minutes. This requirement is perceived to 
exclude wind only response services, while providing market 
signals for storage technologies Ð requiring more capital 
investments. 
The next steps of this work will be to further investigate the 
challenges and costs of implementing solutions to the concerns 
raised in this paper that best fit the energy trilemma, especially 
regarding low inertia scenarios experiencing the maximum loss 
risk described by SQSS.  
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